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Taylor v. Truckee Meadows Fire Prot. Dist., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 1 (Feb. 4, 2021)1
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: SUFFICIENCY OF TEMPORARY, LIGHT-DUTY
EMPLOYMENT UNDER NRS 616C.475(8)
Summary
When determining if an employer’s offer for temporary, light-duty employment is
reasonable and meets the requirements set forth within NRS 616C.475(8), the Court should
consider the proximity of the temporary employment to the individual’s residence as compared
to the prior employment. When determining whether the temporary employment is substantially
similar in hours the Court can look both the number hours of worked per week and the schedule.
The reasonableness of an employer’s offer for temporary, light-duty employment is not
dependent on the mere fact that an individual believes that the employment is beneath them.
Background
In April 2016, Appellant Vance Taylor severely injured his shoulder in a training exercise
while working as a fire captain for respondent Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District
(hereinafter “TMFPD”). After filing a workers’ compensation claim, Taylor received temporary
total disability benefits from respondent Alternative Service Concepts, LLC (“ASC”). In the
three-month period between his injury and shoulder surgery, Taylor accepted light-duty work at
TMFPD’s administrative office in lieu of temporary total disability benefits. During this time,
Taylor worked as a secretary Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and completed data
entry and filing projects under the supervision of the office’s secretary. In July 2016, Taylor
underwent shoulder surgery and began receiving temporary total disability benefits again.
In September 2016, Taylor’s doctors released him to light duty and TMFPD offered
Taylor the same administrative position he had prior to surgery. Taylor refused this offer,
claiming that it did not comply with Nevada law because it changed his work schedule and
required him to perform “humiliating and unlawful” duties. Because TMFPD extended a
temporary light duty employment, ASC terminated Taylor’s temporary total disability benefits.
Taylor administratively appealed ASC’s decision to terminate benefits, and the hearing
officer upheld the decision to terminate benefits. Taylor appealed that decision, and the appeals
officer affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. Taylor then petitioned the district court for
judicial review, claiming that the denial of temporary total disability benefits was erroneous. The
district court denied Taylor’s petition for judicial review and Taylor appealed.
Discussion
NRS 616C.475(8) requires that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by the
employer must (1) be substantially similar to the employee’s position at the time of his or her
injury in relation to the location of the employment and the hours the employee is required to
work; (2) provide a gross wage that is substantially similar to the gross wage the employee was
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earning at the time of the injury; and (3) have the same employment benefits as the position that
the employee had at the time of injury.2
The Court found that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD was
substantially similar in location to Taylor’s preinjury position because (1) the new location was
similar to Taylor’s preinjury work location in proximity and in distance from his residence, and
(2) Taylor failed to demonstrate how the new location imposed an unreasonable burden. The
Court additionally found that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD was
substantially similar in hours to Taylor’s preinjury position. The Court determined that the term
“hours” was ambiguous because it was susceptible to more than one natural and honest
interpretation. Using legislative history, the Court determined that “hours” encompassed both the
actual number of hours worked and the schedule of work.
The Court held that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD was
substantially similar in hours. Although the temporary, light-duty employment offered by
TMFPD totaled to 40 hours a week, as opposed to the 48 hours in his preinjury employment,
Taylor still the same rate of pay. The Court also determined it was substantially similar because
both jobs required Taylor to work during the daytime hours for at least half of his shift. Beyond
that, the Court concluded that common sense required a determination that the schedules are
substantially similar: a determination that the administrative schedule is not substantially similar
to the preinjury firefighter schedule would in effect preclude firefighters from ever receiving an
offer for temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD because non-firefighter
employment does not often run on a firefighter schedule. Thus, some variation in schedule is
necessary.
The Court additionally concluded that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by
TMFPD was substantially similar in gross wage because the calculation included two holidays
and 189 hours of overtime. The Court also held that the offer was reasonable even though some
of the tasks were menial or otherwise in a different capacity than the preinjury job. Additionally,
the Court held that the mere fact that an employee believes that a position is beneath them does
not make that offer unreasonable or invalid.
Conclusion
The Court found that because the temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD
was both reasonable and complied with the requirements set forth in NRS 616C.475(8), ASC
was justified in terminating Taylor’s temporary total disability benefits. As such, the Court
affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Taylor’s petition for judicial review.
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